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Appellees Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Board (the "Board") and Salt Lake
City (collectively the "City") fail to contest and therefore concede the central issue in this
appeal: that Salt Lake City acted in violation of the Utah Municipal Code and outside of
its statutory authority when it created an at-will senior city attorney position.
Furthermore, Salt Lake City admits that it has created numerous other "at-will" positions
in violation of the Code and outside of its statutory authority. It asks the Court to ignore
this pattern of violation and to bar Jodi Howickfs appeal based on estoppel and waiver.
However, Utah law clearly holds that neither estoppel nor waiver prevent Howick's
challenge to the City's actions.
I.

THE CITY HAS CONCEDED THAT IT VIOLATED THE LAW WHEN IT
CREATED AN AT-WILL STAFF ATTORNEY POSITION.
The City concedes that there is no basis under Utah Code Annotated §10-3-1105

to classify the Senior City Attorney position in the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office as an
at-will position. It makes no argument in its Brief that there is any interpretation of
Section 10-3-1105 that permits this position to be classified as at-will, and it has never, in
the 16-month history of this dispute, offered a legal justification for its effort to strip
these attorneys of their protection under Section 10-3-1106. The Brief of Appellees is
therefore simply another effort to avoid review of the important legal question presented
by Howick's appeal: Can Salt Lake City create at-will positions in addition to those
specifically identified in Section 10-3-1105 and act on that basis? The Brief of Appellant
Howick ("Opening Brief) demonstrates that Utah law does not allow the City to do so,

1

whether by ordinance, policy, procedure or contract. Likewise, the City cannot achieve
that result through equitable estoppel, waiver or de facto through delay and obstruction.
II.

THE COURT DETERMINES THIS MATTER UNDER THE
CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD.
The City contends that this Court should review the action of the Board under a

"reasonableness" standard because it claims this case involves a question of mixed fact
and law. It argues that the Board made its decision based on City rules and Preston's
legal opinion, but that Preston, in his opinion, "applied the legal doctrine of'waiver' to
the fact of Ms. Howick's voluntarily signing of an agreement in 1998 to become an atwill employee in exchange for consideration she received." Brief of Appellees at 14.
The City's argument is constructed on several errors. First, the argument falsely
assumes that the Board relied on something other than an opinion of the law. The Board
clearly asked for a legal opinion, and Preston clearly provided one. The Board then
adopted Preston's legal opinion3 regarding Howick's alleged at-will status.4
Second, the argument erroneously assumes that Preston's Opinion involved an
application of law to facts. The matter Preston considered could not involve such an
exercise because whether a party can enter into a contract with a government entity, the

1

Letter of Randy Buckley, R. 96 ("the Board is requesting a legal opinion").
Preston Opinion, R. 87 ("This legal opinion is restricted solely to Ms. Howick's
situation").
3
Transcript of Final Board Meeting, R. Ex. A at 3 ("given the information we received
from Snow, Christensen & Martineau, this mzttter should not be heard by the EAB").
4
Salt Lake City?s position before this Court is contrary to its position before the Board.
There it described Howick's appeal to the Boaird as presenting only a "legal issue of state
law," R. 28, which the Board had no authority to consider and which was "for a court to
decide." R. 30.
2

2

subject matter of which exceeds statutory authority and violates the law, is purely a
question of law and involves no factual analysis. See Section IV below. Howick clearly
raised this question. R. 56. Preston simply chose to ignore it entirely. R. 82-87.
Furthermore, the cases cited by the City do not support its position. These cases
make clear that a deferential mixed fact and law standard applies only in specialized
circumstances that are not present in this case.5 Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 clearly
grant the Board no discretion to determine to whom the protections of Sections 10-31105 and 1106 extend. As the City has acknowledged that is plainly a legal issue for
which the Board may seek a legal opinion if it has a question. Brief of Appellees at 6.
To the extent the Board has been granted any discretion, that grant is limited to
determining "was action warranted... . [and if so] is the action taken proportionate to the
charges?" Salt Lake City Code § 2.24.060, Appendix A. Contrary to the City's
assertions, it does not have unlimited discretion regarding its reasons for termination,
standard of review or procedures. See below at Section VII.
This Court reviews to determine if the Board "abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority." Section 1106(6)(c). However, this statement of the Court's authority to
review the Board's decision grants no "discretion" to the Board. As the Court said in
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991), abuse of
5

These cases point out that a deferential standard applies when the law in a specialized
area is ambiguous or technical, and an agency has specialized expertise and knowledge
that place it in a better position than the courts to interpret those provisions consistent
with regulatory objectives because it understands the industry. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991) (analyzing
UAPA revisions not applicable to this case). This was not the case for Preston or the
Board.
3

discretion is not a standard of review. The term indicates that a board has the ability to
choose among permissible courses of action within the bounds of the law; "[i]t is a legal
term [used] to indicate that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was
commission of error of law in the circumstances."
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a]n agency's determination of its subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Harmon v.
Qgden City Civil Service Comm'n., 917 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1996). "For most
questions of basic statutory interpretation or construction of the law, the court is as suited
to decide the issues involved as is the agency and therefore will review the agency
decision for correctness." Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d
664, 13 (Utah 1991). As this Court found in Tolmaiu 818 P.2d at 27 (Utah App. 1991),
when a tribunal "crosses the law" this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, which
constitutes a finding of an abuse of discretion.
III.

HOWICK IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE CITY'S
ILLEGAL ACTIONS.
The City argues that this Court need not determine whether the creation of an at-

will "appointed senior attorney" position violates the Utah Municipal Code because
under Howick's specific circumstances, she is estopped from challenging the validity of
the Disclaimer she signed. Initially, the Court should not consider this argument, because
Salt Lake City failed to preserve it for consideration on appeal. It cites to no instance on
the record where it preserved this issue, and in fact, this argument is not discussed in the
record. See Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1996) (plaintiff mentioned

4

estoppel below and made some references to it, but did not sufficiently raise the issue to a
"level of consciousness" before the trial court and did not provide the trial court with any
legal authority; this was insufficient to preserve the issue and it could not be considered
on appeal).
Furthermore, the City's argument reverses the inquiry under Utah law, which
requires that the courts first determine whether the object that the contract proposes to
achieve is prohibited by statute. If it is, the law clearly states estoppel cannot be used to
enforce it. The Utah Supreme Court has found that "[i]f the law were such that the
parties could make a contract. .. oblivious to or ignoring the statute . .. [and a party
could] invoke estoppel to preclude [assertion of the statutory limitations]... the statute
would be thus nullified by the simple device of ignoring it. This would . .. have the
harmful effect of depriving the public and third parties of the protection it was designed
to give." McCormick v. Life Insurance Corp. of Am., 308 P.2d 949, 952 (Utah 1957).
See also, Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, % 40, 48 P.3d 918 "if the court finds
that the contract falls within [the prohibitions of] the statute, it need not consider the
purpose and reach of the statute"); Johannessen v. Canyon Rd. Towers Owners Ass'n,
2002 UT App 332, f 25 n.3, 57 P.3d 1119.
The law of estoppel is consistent with the law governing public employment.
When examining public employment rights, courts "must first determine whether the
[government's action]... complies with the requirements of [the statute]" before
considering contractual rights. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah
1992) (noting that the parties inaccurately formulated the issues as a contract action when
5

the County's contract had violated a statute and could not be upheld). See also Code v.
Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT App. 390, If 6, 174 P.2d 113 (ancillary public employment
contract rights "must be consistent with the underlying statutes . . . [contract rights] [can]
not alter or contradict an employee's statutory rights.").
No case cited by the City supports its argument that a public entity can
systematically enter into a series of contracts,6 knowing they are in violation of statute as
the City has conceded, and then argue that each of the other parties to the contracts is
equitably estopped from challenging the contracts. Many of the cases cited by the City
do not involve public entities at all and do not involve any illegality in the private
contract. The private parties were simply estopped or not estopped based on whether
they had clean hands or had acted wrongfully in connection with a lawful contract or
ordinance.

In some, the courts found no contract had ever been formed by the parties

6

The City acknowledges that its practice is widespread. See Brief of Appellees at 41
("However, Ms. Howick has not cited any evidence that any other municipal employees
are dissatisfied with their voluntary at-will status or believe that they were subjected to
an illegal classification."); Id. at 40 ("Nor has Ms. Howick demonstrated that others are
unhappy with the City's employment classifications whereby they are able to
voluntarily choose to become at-will employees in exchange for increased pay")
(emphases added).
7
See Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791 (lender estopped from
enforcing legal loan agreement because its actions lead to loss); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Ins. Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 85 F.3d 992 (2nd Cir. 1996) (airline estopped from
repudiating legal insurance agreement negotiated during bankruptcy with court approval);
Pelton's Spudnuts, Inc. v. Doane, 234 P.2d 852 (Utah 1951) (franchise agreement
enforceable); Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 289 P. 151 (Utah 1930) (employee who
helped create legal water contract estopped from later challenging it); Cluggish v. Koons,
43 N.E. 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 1896) (property owner benefiting from contractor's work
under lawful ordinance estopped from refusing payment based on second ordinance
impliedly repealing first ordinance 20 years latter), Rhodus v. M.P. Geatley, 147 S.W. 2d
631, 638 (Mo. 1941) (remaindermen not estopped from challenging partition sale;
6

and benefits could not be obtained by applying the doctrine of estoppel. In others, the
courts found that estoppel was permissible if a contract did not violate state law, or if a
state law itself was not unconstitutional and did not prohibit city actions. In these cases
the City relies primarily on early Colorado exaction cases, which reflect that the
constitutional parameters of exaction requirements have developed over time. 9 One case
states that where technical violations in procurement processes do not cause harm, they
will not deprive the public of its interest in public procurement.10
Estoppel is a "just and equitable principle that a person is said to be estopped to
take advantage of his own fraud or wrong." Tanner, 289 P. at 154. The City concedes

estoppel "must be applied to do equity and must not be applied in such a manner as to
violate the principles of right and good conscience"). See also Kiewit W. Co. v. City and
County of Denver, 902 P.2d 421 (Colo. App. 1994) (contractor estopped to avoid
-contractual dispute resolution clauses that were lawful under statute and constitution).
8
See Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, 989 P.2d 1077 (private
parties' actions in connection with stock option did not create an enforceable agreement,
nor did promissory estoppel); Whitaker v. The Utah State Retir. Bd., 2008 UT App 282,
191 P.3d 814 (board interpreted statute correctly and plaintiff could not obtain
unauthorized benefits by estoppel).
9
See Chubb v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 690 N.E. 2d 1267, 1269 (Ohio
1998) (public employer entitled to plead estoppel in action by employee in lawfully
created unclassified position; unlike situation where employees were alleged to be
unclassified due to employer's neglect of statutory duty); City of Colorado Springs v.
Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 392 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1964) (early exaction case where the court
treated city's contract as validly executed under law since there were no prohibitions
against it); Lone Pine Corp. v. Ft. Lupton, 653 P.2d 405 (Colo. Ct. App 1982) (early
exaction case where court treated contract as validly executed based on Kitty Hawk);
Boulder Brook Acres, Inc. v. Town and Village of Scarsdale, 491 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (exaction case treating deed as validly executed in four sentence
opinion).
10
See Baukol Builders, Inc. v. County of Grand Forks, 2008 ND 116, 751 N.W.2d 191
(second lowest bidder estopped to challenge award where project not advertised for
required 21 days, but bidder not harmed; bidding procedures are for the benefit of the
public by preventing favoritism and corruption, and securing best work at low price).
7

that it violated the requirements of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 and that it had no legal
authority to make a senior city attorney position at-will. Equity cannot support these acts.
The City may not invoke the equitable defense of estoppel to shield, and thereby enforce,
its unlawful conduct.
IV.

HOWICK HAS NOT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE
CITY'S ILLEGAL ACTIONS.
The City further argues that Howick cannot challenge the City's unlawful acts

because she has waived all statutory and constitutional rights by signing a disclaimer.
This argument again reverses Utah law, which requires that the courts first determine
whether a contract with an unlawful subject matter is enforceable as a waiver. Once
again, the City may not use an illegal and void contract to shield, and thereby enforce, its
unlawful conduct.
The City has conceded that public employment rights are statutory, and ancillary
contracts "[can] not alter or contradict an employee's statutory rights." Code 2007 Ut
App., 390 at Tf 6 (original insertion and emphasis). Thus, courts "must first determine
whether the [government's action] . . . complies with the requirements of [the statute]"
before considering contractual rights. Thurston, 835 P.2d at 168. The City may not use a
disclaimer to violate a statute any more than it may use any other contract to do so.
Here, the City's disclaimers are malum in se and malum prohibitum and therefore
illegal and void. Ockev v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^ 22, 189 P.3d 51 ("contracts .. . which
are malum in se or malum prohibitum, which contravene some rule of public policy, or
violate some public duty . . . are illegal and void."), citing Millard County Sch. Dist. v.

8

State Bank of Millard County, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 (Utah 1932)(noting that a distinction
between "void" and "merely ultra vires" contracts is generally not observed with "public
corporations as distinguished from private or business corporations").
To the extent a "public policy" analysis is applied to such contracts, the
overarching policy in question is a policy against violating the law. See Culbertson v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App. 22, % 12, 177 P.3d 621
(there is an "important public policy of ensuring that . . . [government] is governed by
the rule of law, not of man."). Courts have recognized that when the object achieved by a
contract is prohibited by law, the contract is simply not enforceable. See McCormick 308
P.2d at 952 ("the statute would be thus nullified by the simple device of ignoring it."). In
other words, such a contract violates both the law and public policy, and courts have so
determined when faced with the same arguments that the City is making in Howick's
case.
In Parker v. Ind. School Dist. No. 1-003, 82 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 1996), a school
district asked a teacher to sign a contract allowing it to terminate her employment in
violation of state law. The teacher signed the agreement for several years, then was
terminated. The Tenth Circuit reversed a trial court decision against the teacher, finding
it to be well established law that contract provisions cannot override statutorily created
public employment rights. The court expressly rejected the argument that these statutory
rights could be waived because other types of rights could be waived. It also found that
the cases that the school district relied on "involved contract terms that did not violate
statutory provisions") (original emphasis). Id. at 954. It also found that the public
9

employment statute served a public function in that it promoted the good order and
welfare of the state and the school system by preventing the removal of capable and
experienced teachers for reasons arising from political or personal whim. The court also
rejected as "patently erroneous" the school district's argument that because the statute
contained some exceptions to its protection, the school district should be able to create
other ad hoc exceptions not specified in the statute. Id. at 956.
Like the school district in Parker, the City attempts to argue a variety of cases
discussing waiver that are not on point because they do not involve contract terms that
violate statutory provisions. Some of these cases discuss ordinary waiver principles
where the waiver violates no law.11 Some of these cases point out that a lack of
compliance with mere formalities or technicalities will not render a contract
unenforceable or prevent compliance with a substantive law when policy considerations
favor that outcome.

Many of the cases, on a case-by-case basis, analyze whether to

enforce an otherwise lawful agreement when actions taken pursuant to that agreement

11

See Yates v. American Republics Corp., 163 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1947) (conduct not
intended to waive reassignment provision in oil and gas lease); Legg v. Bd. of Pardons,
2007 UT App 190 (parolee waived immediate parole revocation hearing upon return to
custody); Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, 176 P.3d 464 (question regarding
whether wife's conduct waived rights under divorce decree not preserved on appeal);
Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, 34 P.2d 755 (private lien holder waived an available
statutory argument where it elected to rely on a different statutory protection).
12
See Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1998) (oral agreement to arbitrate may be
enforced in equity where agreement party performed and based on public policy favoring
extrajudicial resolution of disputes); Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581 (Utah 1953)
(statutory procedures for initiating a ballot referendum would not invalidate submission
where noncompliance involved "mere formalities" and "directory" not mandatory
procedures meant to assist those initiating referenda).
10

may contradict a public policy.

Among them, the City relies on cases addressing the

public policy exception to the private employment at-will presumption under which a
statutory policy may render a private at-will contract unenforceable.14 These cases are
unlike Howick's case, where the City seeks to use its at-will contracts and other acts to
violate a statute, and they provide no support for the City's position.
The City also seeks to bolster its argument by infering that Howick acted
voluntarily when signing the Disclaimer. As Parker notes, whether or not a disclaimer is
voluntary, the courts cannot enforce a violation of statutory employment requirements
through the doctrine of waiver. In Parker, the district court found for the school district
based on the teacher's voluntary assent, but the Tenth Circuit reversed "without deciding
whether the purported waiver was voluntary" because the contract terms purporting to
waive the statutory provisions were invalid. Parker 82 F.3d at 954.15

Ockey, 2008 UT 37 at ^| 21 n.12 (trustee lacked authority to convey property based on
a legal private agreement, but under public policy and trust principles, these private
actions could be ratified; contracts can be binding "barring such things as illegality of
subject matter or legal incapacity"); Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp., 2007 UT 96, 175 P.3d
560 (pre-injury release on ski pass was wholly incompatible with public policy served by
statute and unenforcable); Peterson, 2002 UT 43 (trial court required to hold a contract
unenforceable if determined to be within prohibitions of penal statute; if statute not
directly implicated, court had to determine whether nonenforcement would benefit or
harm parties statute designed to protect); Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, 147 P.3d 443
(otherwise legal contract not rendered unenforceable due to lack of compliance with
related statutory provisions where contract did not offend public policy articulated by
statute).
14
Racklev v. Fairview Care Ctrs, Inc., 2001 UT 32, 23 P.3d 1022; Berube v. Fashion
Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395
(Utah 1988) and Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), are all such cases.
See Appointed Senior City Attorney job description, R. 65-66, and Senior City
Attorney job description, R. 67-68. The Appointed Senior City Attorney position was
11

Finally, the City contends that waiver must be enforceable because the Utah
Municipal Code does not expressly state that its provisions cannot be waived. This
argument again ignores the law. The Utah Municipal Code contains statutory powers and
prohibitions that create the City's power to act, and the City has no other power. The
Utah Supreme Court has found that "the absence of express legislative disapproval" does
not prove that a release is valid. Rothstein, 2007 UT 96, at ^f 19 (finding that an act's
expression of public policy may not lend itself to the need for an additional statement
regarding releases).16 Further, the legislative history of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106
does not alter this result. The City's characterization of that history as allowing the City
an "unlimited authority" to "fire employees" is not accurately stated and is not supported
by the plain text or the history itself. The legislative history makes clear that the
Legislature did not establish at-will employment, nor endorse illegal action by cities.
The City's argument regarding waiver is pernicious because while conceding that
its acts were illegal, the City attempts to retain the ability to continue those acts by
eliminating any challenge. Under this argument, the City is free to act illegally without
the burden of judicial review, whether in employment matters or otherwise. The City
available only to more experienced attorneys as an advance in their careers if they would
"accept" an at-will status.
16
For example, the Utah Antidiscrimination Act contains no provision prohibiting the
waiver of its protections, but surely a waiver of its protections by an employee in
exchange for a promotion or raise would be unenforceable.
17
The City cites partial testimony of Rep. David Ure on February 11, 2004. Further,
after Rep. Ure made his comments, a conference committee modified the bill on February
16, 2004 to insert a requirement that the governing body of each municipality prescribe
by ordinance "the standard of review" for the board to use when it hears and determines
the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge. See Appendix B, Conference
Committee Report, 2004 General Session, SB0023S01, February 16, 2004.
12

does not have absolute power. It cannot enforce an illegal act under the guise of a void
and unenforceable waiver.
V.

THE EQUITIES DO NOT FAVOR ENFORCING THE CITY'S ACTIONS.
The City contends that illegal contracts can still be enforced, although both of the

cases it cites expressly state that a contract cannot be enforced if the object it proposes to
achieve is prohibited by statute. Brief of Appellees at 28-29. The City argues the
importance of "freedom of contract" and the "efficiencies" for an employer of at-will
terminations over merit system protection. Brief of Appellees at 25, 30. However, that
balance has been struck by the Legislature for the benefit of the public, as was noted in
Parker.18 As other Utah public employers have recognized, if they wish to remove
positions from statutory protection, they must convince the Legislature to restrike the
balance for those specific positions. See Opening Brief at 13-14, n. 6.
Here, the equities clearly favor Howick. From the outset, the City refused to
provide to Howick the 15-day review required by the Legislature to resolve this matter,
and at every turn it has argued a lack of jurisdiction and sought delay. Howick has
waited 16 months to see the City's legal basis for its conduct only to find that the City
concedes its illegality and never had a basis in the law for its actions.

The City also argues that this result is required because "taxpayer dollars" are involved
However, the Brief of Appellees demonstrates the important public issue of waste that is
raised when public officials willfully choose to violate the law and then engage in a
prolonged court battle without any legal support for their actions instead of correcting the
violations. See Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Utah App. 1992) at
1080 (employer's knowledge that he cannot escape liability tends to ensure compliance in
the first place).
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VI.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTS.
The City argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear Howick's constitutional

due process arguments because the matter is not in the record, the Board had no
jurisdiction to hear it, and this Court is limited to the narrow issue before the Board. The
record of this case is a record of numerous violations of due process as Howick was
terminated at will and was given no meaningful review to protect her property interest.
This Court has recognized that due process arguments may be heard in connection with
an appeal pursuant to statutory processes that protect public employment property rights.
See Lucas v. Murray City Civ. Serv. Comm'n., 949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997); Tohnan,
818 P.2d 23. Further, "this court may decide a case based on any valid ground found
within the record." Bd. of Equalization of Summit County v. State Tax Comm'n., 2004
UT App 283, K 6, 98 P.3d 782.
VIL

THE CITY VIOLATED HOWICK'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
The City argues that Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 do not create a property

interest. This argument is at odds with the Preston Opinion, which acknowledges that
these sections create a property interest prohibiting a termination except for cause, R. 84,
and it is simply incorrect. Those sections clearly establish an entitlement to ongoing
public employment without sufficient basis for termination and limit a supervisor's
discretion to act.
Section 10-3-1105(1) establishes that municipal employees hold employment
"without limitation of time" and are subject to discharge "only as provided in Section 10-
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3-1106." Section 10-3-1106(1) prohibits action because of an employee's politics or
religious belief, or incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers,
governing body, or heads of departments. Further, the Board must determine "the matter
which relates to the cause for discharge." Section 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
Section 10-3-1106(7)(a) mandates that the governing body of each municipality
prescribe by ordinance the standard of review that the Board must apply to that cause,
and the City has done so under Salt Lake City Code § 2.24.060 (the Board must review a
City action by determining "was action warranted... .[and if so,] is the action taken
proportionate to the charges?"). This Court then reviews the determination under Section
10-3-1106(6)(c) to decide if the board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority
when applying the statutory limitations to a given situation.
State law allows cities to "define cause," not act without it, pursuant to Section 103-1105(3). The City has done so under City Policy 3.01.01 (7.1), Appendix C, which
states "[e]mployees may be terminated for the following reasons: A. Cause: employees
may be terminated for cause in accordance with the City's Standards of Conduct and
Disciplinary Guidelines policies. . . B. Failure to pass a probationary period . . .
C. Resignation or retirement. .. D. At-will positions . . . E. [job abandonment]." The
referenced City policies place additional limitations on supervisory actions. For example,
"[disciplinary rules must be reasonable and related to City business." City Policy
3.02.02 (2.3) (Disciplinary Guidelines), Appendix C. See also City Policy 3.02.01
(Standards of Conduct), Appendix C. As the City concedes, Section 10-3-1105 lists the
only positions that are not subject to these rights.
15

The City argues that Howick cannot "look to any contractual provisions for a
protected property interest," Brief of Appellees at 33, but that is irrelevant. Howick's
property interest is created by state law, and the statutory directive is further implemented
as required through City ordinances and policies. These provisions clearly demonstrate
that Howick has not just a right to procedural protections, but a claim of entitlement to
continued public employment.
The City further argues that even if Howick has a property interest, she has been
given due process. The record demonstrates that this is not the case despite the City's
purported checklist of actions. As detailed in her opening Brief, the City denied Howick
any pretermination process, initially denied access to post-termination process, and
denied any meaningful process once it gave her Notice of Appeal to the Board by, among
other things, never addressing her legal arguments. See Opening Brief at 28-33. The
City concedes that Howick's position is entitled to the protections of Sections 10-3-1105
and 1106; it just refuses to provide those protections to Howick.
VIII. HOWICK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
The City wrongly claims that Howick is not entitled to attorney fees on the bases
she asserts. In fact, all of those bases are appropriate, and the City has now clearly
demonstrated that Howick is entitled to attorney fees and double costs by operation of
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedures 33 as well.
Contrary to the City's assertions, under the private attorney general doctrine
Howick's case follows the same pattern as other cases where fees and costs have been
awarded. The first element of Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT App.
16

22, 177 P.2d 621, is met not only by the matters stated in the opening Brief at 34-39, but
by the City's current assertions. The City's positions on estoppel and waiver seek to give
the City the ability to enforce illegal acts despite their conceded illegality and to eliminate
any right to challenge the City.19 If the City has these "rights," it can apply them to
enforce illegal acts in the pursuit of any activity, whether in employment, zoning,
licensing, etc. The City's arguments seek to immunize its violation of statutory
obligations from any meaningful review, and this action will preclude that.
Further, the City's ignoring Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106 subverts the public's
interest in good government, which the Legislature has determined is better served by
prohibiting the termination of public employees in connection with politics or changes in
elected officials and heads of departments, or without cause as defined by each
municipality. The alternative is generally considered to be cronyism, and both state and
90

City law amply demonstrate the intent to prohibit cronyism in government.

Further,

The City argues that this Court may not consider that there are many other City
employees in Howick's position. Brief of Appellees at 13 n. 5. However, the City has
acknowledged this fact (see footnote 7 above), and the Court may take notice of public
records such as the Unclassified Pay Plan and the current Executive Compensation Plan.
Green River Canal Co. v. Thavn. 2003 UT 50, 930 n.8, 84 P.3d 1134.
90

For example, for those few municipal positions that are at-will, state and City law
impose requirements on the qualifications of persons hired. See Utah Code Ann. § 103b-202(3) (chief administrative officer must be appointed on basis of ability and prior
experience in field of public administration, and other qualifications prescribed by
ordinance); Utah Code Ann. § 10-3b-202(l)(c) (mayor shall appoint qualified persons as
officers with council's advice and consent); City Policy 3.01.02 (1.3) (City regular fulltime employees (regularly requiring 40 hours of work per week) must be selected
through an open competitive process). Cronyism also violates public ethics
requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(1 )(b) (prohibition on securing special
privileges for self or others); Salt Lake City Code §§ 2.44.030 and 040, Appendix A,
(similar provisions).
17

cronyism is particularly corrosive to the role of public attorneys, since they have
responsibilities that differ from other attorneys. They may have a duty to question
conduct or pursue investigations, and the public client generally does not have the
ability to seek other counsel. See Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short, 1999 UT 73, U 34,
985 P.2d 899. These responsibilities may make a public attorney's role unpopular at
times, leaving attorneys particularly subject to the whims and animosities of staff that
may be badly or personally motivated, or simply uneducated in public requirements.
Culbertson's second element is also met, since Howick has the same financial
interest in this action that other appellants under this doctrine have had in theirs - the
recovery of her own property, which was illegally taken from her. No case has withheld
fees under this doctrine on the basis that appellant seeks the return of her property.
Finally, Culbertson's third element is met by the extraordinary nature of this case.
The City has spent the past 16 months declaring that no forum had jurisdiction and
refusing to provide the legal basis for its actions. Now that it finally has been forced to
disclose its legal argument, the City concedes the determinative issues in this case and
demonstrates that it never had a legal basis for its actions. Rather than performing its
statutory duty to resolve this matter in 15 days, the City knowingly sought to achieve de
facto what it could not achieve legally for its own benefit. The City's complete disregard
21

Comments under Rule 1.13(h) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct note that
government lawyers "may have a legal duty to question the conduct of government
officials and perform additional remedial or corrective actions including investigation and
prosecution." In contrast to other attorney-client relationships, they may have obligations
to respond to illegal or improper conduct to ensure wrongful acts are prevented or
rectified where public business is involved. "The obligation of the government lawyer
may require representation of the public interest as that duty is specified by law." Id.
18

for its statutory duties, its insistence on trying to evade the law through legal process, its
reckless use of public funds when doing so, and the extensive burdens that it placed on
Howick in an effort to prevent a vindication of her rights are extraordinary.
These same factors demonstrate that the City has consistently acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons during this process. The City knew that
it never had a legal basis for its actions, yet despite its knowledge of illegality, it forced
Howick through 16 months (to date) of lengthy and expensive legal process. The City
knowingly ignored its statutory duty and chose instead to delay and obstruct this matter.
The City also asserts that attorney fees are not available to Howick for the City's
violation of her state constitutional due process rights by claiming that attorney fees
cannot be considered as damages. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that in fact,
attorney fees are a well known aspect of the harm caused by improper employment
terminations.

Howick's case meets the elements stated in Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of

Box Elder County Sch. DisU 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533, and a remedy is appropriate. See
also opening Brief at 43.
Finally, this Court should award attorney fees and double costs to Howick
pursuant to the operation of Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Howick
asserted in her opening Brief that the City pursued this matter for delay and other
frivolous reasons. However, Howick never had the opportunity to review the City's legal
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See Howick v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2008 UT App. 216, n. 1
See Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1991) ("Employers
can reasonably foresee that wrongfully terminated employees will be forced to file suit
. . . and will foreseeably incur attorney fees).
23
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arguments prior to submitting her opening Brief. The City did not present its legal
arguments to the Board, it only attempted to persuade the Board that it was a "fact" that
Howick was an at-will employee, that she was "highly paid," and that this Court should
consider the matter and not the Board. R. 27-30. The City cited no case law and made
no legal arguments. The Brief of Appellees for the first time made clear that the City
never had a claim of right for its actions. Rule 33 permits an award of attomey fees and
double costs on this basis. Howick thus should be awarded fees and double costs
pursuant to Rule 33. Alternatively, this Court may award attorney fees and double costs
as damages upon its own motion pursuant to Rule 33 (c)(1).
IX.

HOWICK IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT.
A.

SECTION 10-3-1106 REQUIRES THAT HOWICK BE
REINSTATED.

The City now seeks to avoid the consequences of its at-will termination of
Howick's employment by arguing that, at most, Howick is entitled to have her case
remanded to the Board for a hearing "on the merits." Brief of Appellees at 45. The City
mistakes the matter. The merits of Howick's appeal were whether she could be
terminated at-will, the only basis the City has ever offered for her termination. Those
merits were considered by the Board when it adopted Preston's incorrect legal opinion,
and when this Court reverses the Board's decision, the effect will be to require Howick's
reinstatement.
The City's only position for the last 16 months has been that Howick was an atwill employee whose employment could be terminated without cause or process. It first
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made that assertion 16 months ago by verbally informing Howick that it was terminating
her employment without prior notice as a "business decision." R. 108. It again made that
assertion in support of its refusal to submit Howick's appeal to the Board. R. 35. It
reiterated that assertion in Howick's earlier appeal. Respondent's Memorandum in
Support of Summary Disposition for Lack of Jurisdiction, Case No. 20070863, at 1-2.
This Court recognized the City's position in its Memorandum Decision. See Howick,
2008 UT App. 216. The City again reiterates that assertion throughout its Brief.
Further, the record demonstrates that the City acted at will and determined "cause"
to be inapplicable. To act "for cause," the City must employ a disciplinary process that
culminates with a written letter of discipline. Employees submit the "written letter of
discipline" when filing an appeal to the Board. Procedures III(B), at Appendix 2 to
opening Brief. The Board can only consider evidence and address issues raised below
"as set forth in the disciplinary letter." Procedures III (C) and V(B). Id. The parties can
present preliminary information relating to the cause for discharge "as set forth in the
disciplinary letter." Procedures VI(A). Id. The employee then presents evidence at a
hearing before the Board regarding the cause for the action taken "as set forth in the
disciplinary letter." City Code 2.24.070, Appendix A. Based on evidence regarding the
cause for the action as set forth in the disciplinary letter, the Board then determines
whether the evidence supports a need for that disciplinary action, and whether that action
was proportionate. Procedures VII (G), at Appendix 2 to opening Brief; City Code
2.24.060, Appendix A. The City makes no claim that it engaged in the pretermination
process required under City ordinances and the Board's procedures culminating in the
21

mandatory "disciplinary letter," and no such letter exists. Thus, no proceeding could
legally be conducted under City ordinances and procedures, and there is no other basis
for termination.
Similarly, the City submitted Howick's complete Notice of Appeal to the Board,
in which she appealed not jurisdiction, but the at-will termination of her employment.
The Board then informed the City that "[ejither party may submit written documentation
pertaining to the appeal" for its consideration. R. 104. Howick did so, and the City
submitted neither facts nor a legal argument to the Board. Howick alleged in her appeal
that she was terminated without notice and without cause. R. 108. The City did not
contest this assertion before the Board and it could not have, since it chose not to follow
pretermination procedures required for a cause termination. The City did not contest
Howick's asserted facts or even attempt to preserve some argument in the alternative, and
thus there is nothing that the Board could consider on remand.24
Furthermore, case law makes clear that this matter cannot be remanded to the
Board as the city suggests. The Board is only empowered to act pursuant to its standard
of review, and when doing so, "[t]he Board may only uphold or overturn the decision of
the Department. The Board may not modify the decision of the Department."
24

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 895 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D. D.C. 1995) (declining
to remand to agency to correct inadequacies in the record and procedural deficiencies: an
agency "is not entitled to a second bite of the apple just because it made a poor
decision — if that were the case, administrative law would be a never ending loop from
which aggrieved parties would never receive justice."). Howick denies the City's
assertions at footnote 1 of Brief of Appellees, and unlike Howick's statements concerning
the circumstances of her termination, the City's assertions are nowhere in Ihe record. The
City is asking not just for a second bite at the apple, but for a second apple.
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Procedures VII(G). Under substantially identical language, this Court has held that a
board "cannot modify the department head's decision or remand the matter to the
department head for further consideration." Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt Lake City
Civil Service Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 877 (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis added). See also,
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commyn, 2000 UT App. 235,1J 23 n. 5, 8 P.3d 1048
(this language "does not authorize the commission to modify suspension or termination
decisions or to remand such decisions for further proceedings"). Thus, this Court has
determined that where the reviewing body may only affirm or reverse once a termination
decision is reversed, the department may take no further action. See also Lucas, 949 P.2d
at 763.
B.

EQUITY REQUIRES THAT HOWICK BE REINSTATED.

The City seeks to obstruct and delay Howick's remedy by any means possible, but
an endless and expensive process would not do equity or be in the public interest.
Throughout this process, the City repeatedly claimed that Howick's appeal could not be
heard, refused to explain its legal basis, has now conceded that it never had a legal basis,
has asked this Court to enforce its illegal acts anyway through equitable and legal
defenses, and now asks this Court for an opportunity to start over in violation of its own
requirements. Howick has already waited 16 months. There is no basis to postpone her
remedy any longer.
Further, if this Court permits the City to attempt a new cause termination process
16 months after terminating Howick's employment at-will, the City will have no
incentive to cease its unlawful conduct. The City loses nothing by creating unlawful at23

will provisions and terminating employees under them if it can cost the employee a year
or two of delay and tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys fees, and after all of that, it
can start over with new "cause" allegations.
C.

THE CITY'S DUTY UNDER CITY ORDINANCES REQUIRES
REINSTATEMENT.

Howick established in her opening Brief that City ordinances place an affirmative
duty on the City to remedy its violations of state employment laws. When the City
violates state employment laws, these ordinances mandate that the City shall take
corrective or curative action and ensure that violations will not recur. Further, the
employee shall be provided relief, including the cancellation of an unwarranted action,
and restoring the employee to the position the employee would have occupied absent the
violation. See Howick's Brief at 25-26. The City's Procedures further require
reinstatement with back salary. Procedures V(E). The City has now conceded that it had
no ability to exceed its authority or violate state law, and that Howick's position was
entitled to the protections of Sections 10-3-1105 and 1106. Thus, consistent with its duty
under Thurston, the City has an affirmative duty by ordinance to reinstate Howick to the
position she would have occupied absent the violation with full back salary and benefits.
See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995).
CONCLUSION
The City wrongfully attempted to convert Howick's employment position to an atwill position, and it concedes that it acted without any claim of right. Neither waiver nor
estoppel bar Howick's challenge to the termination of her employment. The Board
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decision should be reversed, and Howick should be reinstated with full back pay and
benefits, plus interest at the statutory rate. Howick is also entitled to attorneys fees and
double costs for challenging the City's systematic violation of law.
Dated this 2A^

day of December, 2008.

Elizabeth T. Dunning ^
Attorney for Petitioner Jodi Howick
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this @}\^~ day of December, 2008, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners Reply Brief was mailed via the U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid to:
W. Mark Gavre
Parsons Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Salt Lake City Corporation
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Appendices
Appendix A - Salt Lake City Code §§ 2.24.060; 2.24.070; 2.44.030; 2.44.040
Appendix B - Conference Committee Report, 2004 General Session, SB0023S01,
February 16,2004
Appendix C - City Policy 3.01.01 (7.1); 3.01.02 (1.3); 3.02.01; 3.02.02 (2.3)

Tab A

2.24.060 Standard Of Review:
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2.24.060 Standard Of Review:
The employee appeals board shall review a decision by the department head using the
following standard of review:
Step 1: Do the facts support the need for discipline or other remedial action by the department
head? In other words, was action warranted? If the city's account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the decision should be upheld, even though the
board may have weighed the evidence differently had it been in the department head's
position. In order to overturn a disciplinary action, the board must have a definite and firm
conviction that the department head's decision was clearly erroneous.
In an appeal where an employee was discharged, not for disciplinary reasons but because the
employee was no longer able or qualified to do the job, the board's analysis shall end with step
1 of the analysis, as set forth above. However, in an appeal of a disciplinary action the board
shall proceed to step 2 of the analysis, as set forth below.
Step 2: In a disciplinary action, if the facts support the need for action to be taken, is the action
taken proportionate to the charges? Discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within the
discretion of the department head. Unless the board finds the penalty is so harsh as to
constitute an abuse, rather than an exercise of the department head's discretion, the decision
of the department head should be upheld. (Ord. 62-05 • 1, 2005)
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2.24.070 Rights Of Appellant:
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2.24.070 Rights Of Appellant:
An appellant may present relevant information in mitigation, including the presentation of
witnesses and other evidence. Such evidence must relate to: a) the cause for the action taken
as set forth in the disciplinary decision letter, and b) any issues raised at the proceeding before
the department head. (Ord. 62-05 • 1, 2005)
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2.44.030 Disclosure And Disqualification:
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2.44.030 Disclosure And Disqualification:
Whenever the performance of a public servant's or volunteer public servant's official duty shall
require any governmental action on any matter involving the public servant's or volunteer
public servant's financial, professional, or personal interests and it is reasonably foreseeable
that the decision will have an individualized material effect on such interest, distinguishable
from its effect on the public generally, the public servant or volunteer public servant shall
disclose such matter to the city council, in the case of the mayor, and in all other cases to the
mayor and to the members of the body, if any, of which the public servant or volunteer public
servant is a member. The disclosure shall be made in the manner prescribed in section
2.44.050 of this chapter and shall identify the nature and extent of such interests. The public
servant or volunteer public servant shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in any
deliberation as well as from voting on such matter. (Ord. 4-07 D 2, 2007: Ord. 88-98 D 2,
1998)
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2.44.040 Prohibited Acts Designated:
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2.44.040 Prohibited Acts Designated:
A. A public servant or volunteer public servant may not:
1. Unless otherwise allowed by law, disclose confidential information acquired by reason of
the public servant's or volunteer public servant's official position or in the course of official
duties or use such information in order to: a) substantially further the public servant's or
volunteer public servant's personal, financial, or professional interest or the personal,
financial, or professional interest of others; or b) secure special privileges or exemptions for
the public servant or volunteer public servant or others.
2. Corruptly use or attempt to use the public servant's or volunteer public servant's official
position to: a) further the public servant's or volunteer public servant's personal, financial, or
professional interest or the personal, financial, or professional interest of others; or b)
secure special privileges, treatment, or exemptions for the public servant or volunteer
public servant or others.
B. A public servant may not have a financial interest in an entity that is doing business with the
city department in which the public servant is employed. A volunteer public servant may not
have a financial interest in an entity that is doing business with the city department or
division to whom the city committee, commission, authority, agency, or board of which the
volunteer public servant is a member primarily provides direct assistance or direction. For
purposes of this subsection, the city department of a member of the city council shall be
deemed to be the city council office, and the city department of the mayor shall be deemed
to be all city departments.
C. No elected officer, spouse or child of an elected officer, or business entity in which an
elected officer has a substantial interest, may apply for or receive a loan or grant of money
from the city. (Ord. 4-07 • 3, 2007: Ord. 88-98 • 2, 1998)
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Utah State Legislature
Senate • 319 State Capitol • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-1035 • Fax: (801) 538-1414
House of Representatives • 318 State Capitol • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
(801) 538-1029 • Fax: (801) 538-1908

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
February 16, 2004

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker:
The Joint Conference Committee comprised of Sens. Thomas Hatch, Beverly Evans, and
Gene Davis, and Reps. Michael E. Noel, David Ure, and James R. Gowans, recommends 1st
Sub. S.B. 23, AMENDMENTS TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, by Senator T. Hatch, with
the following amendments:
1.

Page 5, Line 125:

After "an appeal" insert "and the standard of
review"
Respectfully,

Sen. Thomas Hatch
Senate Chair, Conference Committee

Rep. Michael E. Noel
House Chair, Conference Committee
Voting: 6-0-0
17 SB0023CC1WPD
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Bill Number

Action Class

SB0023S01

C

Enrolled Copy

S.B. 23
AMENDMENTS TO MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
2004 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor: Thomas V. Hatch
LONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill modifies provisions of the Utah Municipal Code relating to municipal officers
and employees.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
•

modifies the officers and employees of a municipality to whom certain provisions

relating to the duration of employment and appeals from employment decisions
apply;
•

modifies the composition of an appeal board for employment decisions;

•

modifies the process for appealing an action or decision of the appeal board;

•

expands circumstances covered by provisions relating to limitations on taking

negative employment action;
•

requires rather than permits the appeal board to provide that an employee receive

back salary if the board finds in favor of the employee; and
•

makes technical changes.

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None
Utah Code Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
10-3-1105, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977
10-3-1106, as enacted by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1977
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 10-3-1105 is amended to read:
10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment —
Exceptions.
[All appointive officers and employees of municipalities, other than members of the police
departments, fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents,]
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall hold
[their] employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge [or dismissal only as
hereinafter provided.], suspension of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a
position with less remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (I) does not apply to:
fa) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive power
in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a member
of the classified civil service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(cD a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a
municipality's ability to define cause for an employee termination or reduction in force.
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Section 2. Section 10-3-1106 is amended to read:
10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals —
Board — Procedure.
(1) [No officer or] An employee [covered by] to which Section 10-3-1105 [shaH] applies
may not be discharged, suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration;
(a) because of [his] the employee's politics or religious belieff;]; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or
heads of departments, [hi all cases where any officer or]
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without pay, or
involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, [he
shall have the right to] the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge^
suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal board
[which shall consist of five members, three of whom shall be chosen by and from the appointive
officers and employees, and two of whom shall be members of the governing body], established
under Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall
exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
[(2) The] (3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice
of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives
notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(ji) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the dischargea
suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of [the] an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the [eity] municipal
recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the [same] appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall
forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence* and fully hear and determine the
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matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
[(3) The] (4) An employee [shall be entitled to] who is the subject of the discharge,
suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and [to] be represented by counselfT^to];
(b) have a public hearing[7"to];
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered[;]; and [to]
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
[(4) hi the event the appeal board upholds the discharge or transfer, the officer or
employee may have 14 days thereafter to appeal to the governing body whose decision shall be
final, hi the event the appeal board does not uphold the discharge or transfer the case shall be
closed and no further proceedings shall be had.]
(5) [The] fa) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
certified to the recorder [with] within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it[. The
board may, in its decision,], except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to
a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that [an] the employee shall
receive [his];
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which [he] the employee is
dischargedf;] or suspended without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period [he] during which the employee was transferred
to a position of less remuneration [but not to exceed a 15 day period, hi no case shall the
appointive officer or employee be discharged or transferred, where an appeal is taken, except
upon a concurrence of at least a majority of the membership of the governing body of the
municipality].
[(6) hi the event that the appeal board docs not uphold the discharge, or transfer, the
recorder shall certify the decision to the employee affected, and also to the head of the department
from whose order the appeal was taken. The employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with
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the next working day following the certification by the recorder of the appeal board!s decision,
provided that the employee, or officer, concerned reports for his assigned duties during that next
working day.]
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals by filing with that court a notice of appeal.
(b) Each notice of appeal under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals1 review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, [and] the
number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an
appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality
by ordinance^ but the provisions for choosing the three members from the appointed officers and
employees shall in no way restrict a free selection of members by the appointive officers and
employees of the municipality].
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor
form under Part 12, Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, an ordinance adopted under
Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the
appeal board.
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Employment, Hiring, and Termination

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:

Division of Human Resource Management

KEYWORDS: Employment, employee, employer, hiring, hire, full-time, part-time, season, seasonal,
civil service, career service, intern, internship, exempt, non-exempt, Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA,
appointed, appoint, at-will, affirmative action, discrimination, equal opportunity, benefit, benefits,
modified duty, injury, injured, termination, terminate, fire, resign, resignation, cause, reason, orientation,
probation, merit, qualifications, relocation, tuberculosis, TB, testing, test.
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7.

Termination

7.1

City employees may be terminated for the following reasons:

i age i ui z.

A. Cause: employees may be terminated for cause in accordance with the City's Standards of
Conduct and Disciplinary Guidelines policies;
B. Failure to pass a probationary period: at the supervisor's discretion, employees may be
terminated during their probationary period, as defined in union agreements, compensation plans,
job descriptions, written agreements, or Civil Service Rules and Regulations;
C. Resignation or retirement: termination occurs when an employee chooses to leave his/her
position;
D. At-will positions: at-will employees may be terminated at the discretion of the appointing
official.
E. If the City has no contact with an employee for three (3) working days, the City will
consider the employee to have abandoned his or her job and resigned, in the absence of
extenuating circumstances.

CURRENT REFERENCES:
Worker's Compensation policy
Standards of Conduct policy
Disciplinary Guidelines policy
U.C.A. 67-19-15
SLCC2.52.

Fair Labor Standards Act
Human Resource Management procedures
Employee compensation plans
Bargaining Unit Memoranda of Understanding
Human Resources benefits documents
CFR 29 1910.134
Center for Disease Control Strategic Plan on TB
Alcohol and Drugs policy

Relocation Procedure
PRE-1995 REFERENCES:
City policy 4.01.102
4.01.200
4.01.202
4.01.203
4.01.204
4.01.308
4.01.400
4.01.502
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4.02.203
4.03.100
4.05.100
4.06.100
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1,1995
DATE APPROVED BY CABINET: September 6,1995
Revised: March 13,1996
April, 2002: bargaining Unit Memorandum of Understanding
July 9 2004: inclusion of Executive Order on Non-Discrimination
Effective Date of Current Revision (Date Signed by Mayor): July 18,2007
(7.1 E changed to three working days from five)
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Employment, Hiring, and Termination

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:

Division of Human Resource Management

KEYWORDS: Employment, employee, employer, hiring, hire, full-time, part-time, season, seasonal,
civil service, career service, intern, internship, exempt, non-exempt, Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA,
appointed, appoint, at-will, affirmative action, discrimination, equal opportunity, benefit, benefits,
modified duty, injury, injured, termination, terminate, fire, resign, resignation, cause, reason, orientation,
probation, merit, qualifications, relocation, tuberculosis, TB, testing, test.
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General

1.1 Salt Lake City administers a merit employment system that encourages the attraction, hiring,
retention, and promotion of employees based on their qualifications within the personnel systems
established by state law: Career Service and Civil Service.
1.2 Certain employees are "at will" and serve at the pleasure of the Mayor (see definition in
Employment Status policy).
1.3 The City will assure equal employment opportunity to all employees and applicants for
employment and/or promotion. The City will also prohibit any employment practice which
discriminates against any employee or applicant for employment with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment based on protections granted by Title VII, or executive order
on non-discrimination, unless based on job-related or bona fide occupational qualifications.
1.4

The City will adhere to the spirit and practice of established affirmative action guidelines.

1.5 The City provides upward mobility for employees through recruitment and career ladder
movement of qualified candidates among existing City employees to fill available positions.
1.6

The Division of Human Resource Management guides the employment process.

1.7

Definitions:
A. Civil Service: All places of employment in the Police and Fire Departments except the
heads of these departments and their deputy chiefs.
B. Career Service: All places of employment within Salt Lake City, not including Civil
Service positions, and those elected, appointed, and statutory officers designated by the Mayor.
C. Pre-bid rights: The process which allows qualified 100 and 200 Series employees to receive
prioritized consideration for other 100 and 200 Series positions.
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Employment Status

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:

Division of Human Resources

KEYWORDS: Employment, type, status, at will, appointed, part time, full time, seasonal, intern,
exempt, non-exempt, telecommuting.
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General
1.1 Regular full-time employees are eligible for the City's benefits package, subject to the
terms, conditions, and limitations of each benefit program and to each employee's election to
participate in specific benefit programs.
1.2 Regular part-time employees are eligible for some benefits sponsored by Salt Lake City,
subject to the terms, conditions, and limitations of each benefit program and to each employee's
election to participate in specific benefit programs.
1.3 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are selected through an open
competitive process.
1.4 Part-time and seasonal employees and interns are only entitled to benefits required by
federal, state, or municipal law.
1.5 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are subject to a probationary period to
determine if further employment with the City is appropriate. The duration of the probationary
period is designated when vacancies are filled.
1.6 At their discretion, supervisors may extend probationary periods due to job cycle
requirements or performance problems or goals. Such extensions shall not exceed 60 days, and
must be made in writing not later than 30 days prior to the conclusion of the original
probationary period. This provision does not apply to Civil Service employees.
I
i

1.7 Regular full-time and regular part-time employees are entitled to bidding rights as
specified in applicable memoranda of understanding or Division of Human Resources
procedures approved by the Attorney's Office.
1.8

1.9

At will positions are:
A.

Executive employees who report directly to the Mayor or a Department Director;

B.

Unclassified Employees;

C.

Part-time and seasonal employees; and,

D.

Regular employees who have not yet completed their probationary period.

Definitions:
A. Regular full-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 40 hours per week
on a full-time schedule.
B. Regular part-time: Employees whose positions regularly require 20 hours or more
but less than 40 hours per week.
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C. Part-time or hourly: Employees whose positions require less than 20 hours per
week.
D. Seasonal: Employees who work during a specific season, as defined by the
department, equal to or less than eleven months in duration.
E. Intern: Students working for the City through a recognized university or college for
a specified period of time, as defined by the department.
F. Exempt/Non-exempt: Employees "exempt" or "non-exempt" from the payment of
overtime in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act.
G. Probationary period: The period of time that an employee serves as part of the
hiring process before career service or civil service status is granted to the employee. For
career service employees this period is 180 days. For civil service employees, the length
of probationary periods is determined by the Civil Service Commission.
H. Telecommuting: A work arrangement in which the workplace is located, at least
part of the time, at an alternative location such as an employee's residence.
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Standards of Conduct

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:
KEYWORDS:
firearms.
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Division of Human Resources

Conduct, behavior, ethics, discipline, elections, conflict of interest, weapons, guns,
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General

1.1 City employees will dedicate themselves to the highest ideals of professionalism, honor, and
integrity in order to merit the trust, respect, and confidence of the public they serve.
1.2 It is the policy of Salt Lake City Corporation to provide employees with due process and equal
protection. Review of potential violations must be coordinated through the Division of Human
Resources.
1.3 During work hours, City employees will devote their whole time, attention, and efforts to City
business.
1.4

Employees will maintain safe and orderly equipment, including City vehicles.

1.5 Employees are to meet performance standards and goals in order to effectively serve the public,
and meet the City's standards for efficient, safe, effective, and courteous operations.
1.6 De minimus personal use of City equipment and information technology by employees, with prior
departmental approval, is permissible if fully reimbursed. City employees may not use City equipment
or information technology for personal gain or inappropriately.
1.7

Employees shall abide by the provisions of all official City policies and procedures.

1.8 The following types of behavior are considered inappropriate and will subject the employee to
non-disciplinary or disciplinary action.
a. Falsifying or altering documents, or otherwise providing false or intentionally misleading
information.
b. Insubordination.
c. Possession of firearms or other weapons on City property or while on City business, except as
permitted by Utah law.
d. Use of City property for personal use unless authorized, except as expressly authorized by City
ordinance or policy
e. Committing any action that may constitute a crime, either on-duty or off-duty, where such action
adversely reflects on the employee's ability to perform assigned duties.
f. Disregarding safety regulations or guidelines.
g. Disrespectful behavior towards any supervisor in the employee's chain of command.
h. Disrespectful behavior towards another City employee or towards a citizen.
i. Stealing, destroying, damaging, defacing or threatening to damage or destroy City property, workrelated documents, work areas, or personal property of others while at work or in connection with work.
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Failure to comply with uniform, dress, or grooming requirements in the workplace.

k. Failure to comply with federal, state or local law, where such action adversely reflects on the
employee's ability to perform assigned duties or is inimical to the public service.
1.

Malfeasance, nonfeasance, or acts inimical to the public service.

m.
Refusal to respond to an official request for factual information or willfully impeding a formal
investigation after notification that such response is required in the investigation.
n. Refusal to appear for a directed fitness for duty evaluation or follow through with a directed
testing or evaluation process.
o. Filing a malicious, fraudulent, or frivolous complaint with the intent to cause harm, disrupt City
services, or with reckless disregard or intent to harass.
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Conflicts of Interest

2.1 Salt Lake City employees will strictly avoid conflicts of interest (see U.C.A. 10-3-1301, et. seq.,
and 67-16-1, et. seq.; S.L.C.C. 2.44. and 2.52.170, et.seq.).
2.2 City employees will not have any investment, directly or indirectly, in any transaction which
creates a conflict with their official duties.
2.3 City employees will not endorse commercial products or services by the use of their pictures,
endorsements, or quotations in paid advertisements, while on City time or with the use of City
equipment or property. During off duty time, approval by a department head is required.
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3.

Vehicles

3.1

City employees shall maintain City vehicles appropriately and use them safely and courteously.

3.2 City employees shall report any vehicle accidents or damages to their supervisor immediately and
cooperate fully with any investigations.

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:
KEYWORDS:

Division of Human Resources

Conduct, behavior, ethics, discipline, elections, conflict of interest, weapons, guns, firearms.

CURRENT REFERENCES: U. CA. 10-3-1301 - 10-3-1312
UjCA67-J6^leL seq.
SL.CC 2.44.
S.L.CC 2.52.170 et. seq.
Alcohol and Drugs policy
PRE-1995 REFERENCES: City policy
4.02.101
5.03.100
5.03.300
5.06.100
EFFECTIVE DA TE:

October 1, 1995

DATE APPROVED BY CABINET:
REVISED:

4.02.100

September 6, 1995

May 6, 1996
June 7, 1996

Effective date of current revision (Date signed by Mayor): March 8, 2007
(Policy clarifications)
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Disciplinary Guidelines

RESPONSIBLE CITY AGENCY:
KEYWORDS:
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Division of Human Resources

Discipline, disciplinary, conduct, behavior.
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General

1.1 In an effort to modify unacceptable behavior or performance, Salt Lake City may discipline
employees whose conduct jeopardizes the City's mission or detracts from the City's effective operation.
1.2 The City has an interest in ensuring that employees maintain necessary job qualifications and
avoid behavior, job performance, or lack of action which disrupts the workplace, undermines the
authority of management, impairs close working relationships, or otherwise impedes a safe, efficient,
and effective workplace environment.
1.3 The City may discipline employees for any substantive violation of any City policies or
procedures, or for malfeasance, nonfeasance, neglect of duty, insubordination, misconduct, inefficiency
or inability to satisfactorily perform assigned duties, unprofessional conduct at the workplace or at
anytime while performing job duties or acts inimical to the public service.
1.4 Discipline may include suspension from scheduled work without pay, reduction in pay,
withholding of merit, demotion, forfeiture of all rights of seniority (for violations of City Code
2.52.170), or termination.
1.5 Managers and supervisors may also attempt to modify unacceptable behavior or performance
through non-disciplinary intervention.
1.6 Non-disciplinary intervention may include re-training, coaching and counseling, verbal
warnings/reprimands, or written warnings/reprimands.
1.7 Prior to receiving discipline or a written warning/reprimand, the manager or supervisor shall
provide the employee notice and an opportunity to respond to the violation of policy/procedure or other
workplace failure.
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Supervisors' disciplinary guidelines

2.1 Supervisors are responsible for upholding the City's mission, and should take non-disciplinary or
disciplinary action when necessary to maintain an effective and efficient workplace.
2.2

Within reason, employees should have prior notice of prohibited conduct.

2.3 Disciplinary rules must be reasonable and related to City business. Penalties must not be
substantially disproportionate to the misconduct and may be affected by the employee's past work
history and disciplinary record.
2.4 Discipline must be based on sufficient evidence of misconduct, substandard performance, or
another basis for action.
CURRENT REFERENCES: Employment, Hiring, and. Termination policy
Standards of Conduct policy
Municipal Employees Ethics Act (10-3-1301 et. seq.)
Employee Compensation Plans
Bargaining Unit Memoranda of Understanding
Information Technology Policy
PRE-1995 REFERENCES:
EFFECTIVE DA TE:

City policy

82-3

October 1, 1995

DATE APPROVED BY CABINET:

September 6, 1995

Effective Date of Current Revision (Date signed by Mayor): March 8, 2007
(Clarification of guidelines)
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